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ARTICLE 
HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW HALTED THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN MARYLAND 
By: Arnold Rochvarg* 
Over the years, various arguments have been made to challenge 
death sentences given to convicted criminal defendants. I These 
arguments have primarily been based on constitutional claims 
involving ineffective assistance of counsel,2 equal protection,3 right to 
trial by jury,4 and cruel and unusual punishment.s Constitutional 
Criminal Law arguments were again raised in the recent Maryland 
case, Evans v. Maryiand,6 which sought to overturn the death sentence 
of a hired killer who had been convicted of two counts of first degree 
murder. 7 None of these arguments were successful. An 
Administrative Law argument, however, was successful not only in 
stopping the execution of Evans, but also in halting the death penalty 
in Maryland.s 
The Administrative Law argument that was successful in Evans 
was based on the statutory procedures which must be followed in 
order for an administrative agency to adopt a valid, legally binding 
regulation.9 This argument is of recent vintage in Administrative Law 
litigation, and it appears to have had its first application to the death 
penalty in Evans. This Administrative Law argument has the potential 
for wide application, and is another reminder why it is so important for 
all lawyers, regardless of what area of law they practice, to understand 
the principles of Administrative Law. 
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. Author of MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW (MICPEL 2d ed. 2007). 
1. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972); Oken v. Maryland, 378 Md. 179,835 A.2d 1105 (2003), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 1017 (2004). 
2. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
3. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
4. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
5. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
6. 396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25 (2006). 
7. [d. at 269-70, 914 A.2d at 33. 
8. Evans, 396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25. 
9. See generally ARNOLD ROCHVARG, MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 5.1 (MICPEL 
2d ed. 2007). 
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In 1983, Vernon Evans ("Evans") was paid $9,000 to kill a husband 
and wife who were both potential witnesses in an upcoming federal 
criminal case. IO Evans killed the husband and another woman whom 
Evans mistakenly believed was the woman he had been hired to kill. I I 
In 1984, Evans was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death.12 The convictions and sentence were originally 
affirmed on appeal,13 but in 1991, a post-conviction proceeding 
resulted in a new sentencing hearing. 14 After this new sentencing 
hearing, a second jury also sentenced Evans to death. 15 The recent 
opinion by the Court of Appeals of Maryland concerned this second 
death sentence. 
Capital punishment was accomplished in Maryland, until 1955, by 
hanging. 16 In 1955, legislation was enacted which ended death by 
hanging and replaced it with death by lethal gas. 17 The gas chamber 
was regarded by the legislature at that time to be "less painful and 
more dignified than hanging or electrocution.,,18 By 1993, Mar~land 
was the only state that used lethal gas for capital punishment. 9 A 
"Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty" in 1993 
recommended that lethal injection be substituted for the gas chamber 
as the sole method of execution in Maryland.2o In 1994, legislation 
was enacted and codified in Title 3, section 3-905(a) of the 
Correctional Services Act.21 This section provides: "the manner of 
inflicting the punishment of death shall be the continuous intravenous 
administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate or 
other similar drug in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until 
a licensed physician gronounces death according to accepted standards 
of medical practice." 2 In response to this legislation, the Department 
of Corrections (DOC) adopted an "Execution Operations Manual" 
10. Evans, 396 Md. at 269, 914 A.2d at 33. 
II. [d. 
12. !d. at 269-70, 914 A.2d at 33. 
13. [d. at 270, 914 A.2d at 33 (respectively referring to Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 855 
A.2d 291 (2004); Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985)). 
14. [d. at 270, 914 A.2d at 33. 
15. !d. 
16. [d. at 342,914 A.2d at 76 (discussing the Report of the Governor's Commission on the 
Death Penalty). 
17. Id. 
18. [d. 
19. Id. (citing the Report of the Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty at 215). 
20. !d. 
21. MD. CODE ANN. CORR. SERVS. § 3-905(a) (1999). 
22. [d. 
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("EOM") which sets forth the details of how the execution should be 
implemented.23 The EOM includes topics such as the responsibilities 
of DOC personnel, pre-execution procedures, security for inmates 
awaiting executions, and a "Lethal Injection Checklist" which sets 
forth the contents of the lethal injection and the method of injecting 
it. 24 
I. ARGUMENTS RAISED IN EVANS 
In an earlier death penalty case, Oken v. Maryland,25 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that Maryland's method of execution by 
lethal injection did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.26 This 
issue was not central to Evans' appea1.27 Rather, Evans made the 
following five arguments to overturn his death sentence:28 
(1) A new sentencing hearing was required because Evans' 
attorneys at the second sentencing hearing failed to investigate and 
present mitigating evidence relating to his background. This 
constituted prejudicial, ineffective assistance of counsel under Wiggins 
v. Smith29 and Rompilla v. Beard. 30 
(2) Under the holding of Miller-El v. Dretke,31 a new trial on 
Evans' gUilt was required because the prosecution in the selection of 
the jury at the 1984 trial had exercised its peremptory strikes in a 
racially discriminatory manner. 
(3) The death sentence imposed on Evans was unconstitutional 
because of selective prosecution by the Baltimore County State's 
Attorney's Office based on racial and geographic discrimination. 
(4) The EaM, which sets forth the details of the implementation of 
the death penalty by lethal injection, conflicted with the statute which 
adopted lethal injection as Maryland's method of capital punishment. 
(5) The EaM was invalid and thus could not be the basis of any 
execution by lethal injection because the EaM was a "regulation" 
23. Evans, 396 Md. at 337, 914 A.2d at 73. 
24. For discussion of some of the details of execution, see id. at 338, 914 A.2d at 73. 
25. 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003). 
26. Id. at 269,835 A.2d at 1157. 
27. Evans, 396 Md. at 328 n.13, 914 A.2d at 67 n.13 ("We shall ... regard any cruel and 
unusual punishment claim as having been knowingly and voluntarily waived with respect 
to the appea1."). 
28. Id. at 269-71, 914 A.2d at 33-34. 
29. 539 U.S. 510, 534-35 (2003). 
30. 545 U.S. 374, 388-93 (2005). 
31. See 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
122 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 37 
within the definition of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA). The EOM had not been adopted in compliance with the APA 
procedural requirements for the adoption of a regulation. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected Evans' first four 
arguments, but granted relief on the fifth argument. 32 The Court 
agreed that the EOM was a regulation that had never been properly 
adopted under the APA.33 This holding required an injunction against 
the carrying out of any death sentence by lethal injection in Maryland, 
including the death sentence imposed on Evans.34 
The vast majority of the Court's opinion is concerned with the 
arguments involving ineffective assistance of counsel and racial 
discrimination.35 These arguments, which have been raised in other 
death penalty cases, were rejected by the majority of the Court after a 
detailed, careful analysis. These Constitutional Criminal Law 
arguments have been extensively discussed by numerous 
commentators,36 and this article is not concerned with them. The 
winning argument for Evans (and all death penalty opponents) - the 
Administrative Law procedure argument - had not been raised in any 
death penalty appeal prior to Evans. The Court's analysis of this issue 
is relatively short, straightforward and simple. As discussed in this 
article, the Court of Appeals of Maryland was clearly correct in its 
conclusion on this issue. 
II. APA RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS 
The AP A defines the term "regulation" as a statement that has 
general application, future effect and is adopted by an agency to detail 
or carry out a law that the agency administers or which governs the 
agency's organization, procedure or practice. 37 The label placed on 
the statement by the agency does not control whether the statement is a 
regulation. Something is a regulation even if the agency calls it a 
guideline, a standard, a statement of policy, a directive, an 
interpretation or anything else if it satisfies the definition of regulation 
32. Evans. 396 Md. at 271, 914 A.2d at 34. 
33. Id. 
34. !d. at 256, 914 A.2d at 80-8\. 
35. See generally id. 
36 A Westlaw search of law review articles on "death penalty," "capital punishment," and 
"constitutional attack," indicates that there have been over 20,000 articles discussing the 
issue. http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Mar. 18,2007). 
37. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § IO-IOl(g)(I) (2004 & Supp. 2006) [hereinafter STATE 
GOY'T §_l 
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set forth in the APA.38 The only statement that meets the definition of 
regulation, but is not treated as a regulation under the Maryland AP A, 
is a statement that "concerns only the internal management" of the 
agency and "does not affect directly the rights of the public or the 
procedures available to the public.,,39 
The major significance to whether something is a regulation is that 
in order for an agency to base its action on a regulation, the regulation 
must have been adopted by the agency pursuant to the procedural 
requirements for adoption of regulations as set forth in the AP A. These 
procedures include prior review and approval by the Attorney 
General,4o review and approval by a joint committee of the House of 
Delegates and the Senate known as the Joint Committee on 
Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review ("AELR 
Committee"), 41 and publication of a notice of proposed adoption of 
the regulation in the Maryland Register.42 This published notice must 
include "the estimated economic impact of the proposed regulation on 
the revenues and expenditures" of agencies of the state and local 
governments, and upon consumers, businesses, industries, taxpayers, 
and trade groupS.43 The published notice of proposed adoption of a 
regulation must also set forth the "date, time, and place for a public 
hearing at which oral or written views and information" can be 
submitted to the agency either in support of or in opposition to the 
proposed regulation.44 If the agency wants to adopt a proposed 
regulation that has been opposed by the AELR Committee, the 
proposed regulation is submitted to the Governor who has the ultimate 
power to order the agency to withdraw it, modify it or adopt it.45 If 
adopted, a notice of adoption is published in the Maryland Register.46 
A regulation, as defined by the AP A, cannot be relied upon by an 
agency if the above described procedures have not been followed, 
unless the agency can establish that what is being challenged concerns 
38. See Massey v. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety & COlT. Servs., 389 Md. 496, 527, 886 A.2d 
585, 603 (2005) (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting). 
39. STATE GOV'T § 10-101(g)(2)(i). 
40. STATE GOV'T § 1O-107(b). 
41. STATEGov'T§ 10-101 (c). 
42. STATE Gov'T § 1O-112(a)(2). 
43. STATE GOV'T § 10-112(a)(3)(i). 
44. STATE GOV'T § 1O-112(a)(3)(v). 
45. STATE GOV'T § 10-111.1 (c). 
46. STATE GOV'T § 1O-114(a) (Supp. 2006). 
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only the internal management of the agency and does not affect 
directly the rights of the public.47 
III. MARYLAND CASES DISCUSSING WHETHER 
"SOMETHING" IS A REGULATION 
The significance of the Maryland APA's definition of regulation 
seems to have been only recently recognized by Maryland courts. The 
first Court of Appeals of Maryland decision addressing the argument 
that an agency statement was a regulation, and was invalid because it 
had not been adopted pursuant to the required AP A procedures, was 
not until 1996. That opinion did not rely on the APA definition of 
regulation in reaching its conclusion. The case, Department of Health 
& Mental Hygiene v. Chimes, 48 upheld the agency's decision to 
impose a cap on the growth of the amount payable to reimburse 
providers of services to persons with developmental disabilities.49 This 
growth cap had been adopted by the agency without following the 
APA procedures for a regulation.5o In response to the procedural 
challenge to the frowth cap, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld 
the growth cap.5 The Court relied upon the following grounds for its 
holding: 
1. the growth cap did not have widespread application; 
2. the growth cap did not change existing law; 
3. the growth cap did not apply retroactively; 
4. the agency had a strong interest in adopting a cost 
containment policy as quickly as possible.52 
In 2001, the First Edition of my book Maryland Administrative 
Law53 was published. In that edition, I criticized the Chimes opinion, 
and called it "not useful" because its holding was not based on the 
Maryland APA's definition of regulation.54 I wrote at that time that 
the issue in Chimes should have been decided "solely on the definition 
of regulation as it appears in the APA.,,55 
47. STATE GOV'T § 10-101 (g)(2)(i). 
48. 343 Md. 336,681 A.2d 484 (1996). 
49. [d. at 347-48, 681 A.2d at 489. 
50. [d. at 342-43, 681 A.2d at 487. 
51. [d. at 347-48, 681 A.2d at 489. 
52. [d. at 346-47, 681 A.2d at 489. 
53. ARNOLD ROCHV ARG, MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (MICPEL 1 st ed. 2001). 
54. [d. § 2.2, at 8-10. 
55. [d. § 2.2, at 10. 
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In 2002, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Delmarva 
Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission.56 The Public 
Service Commission (PSC) had adopted "standards" that governed 
issues arising from the diversification and expansion of business 
activities by regulated utilities into areas of non-regulated business 
activities. 57 For example, the standards prohibited joint advertising, 
joint sales calls and joint office locations between a utility and a non-
regulated affiliate. 5 These standards had the most immediate 
application to the utility Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. and its affiliate, 
BGE Home, but the standards applied to all utilities.59 Several utilities 
challenged these standards because they believed these standards were 
regulations that had been adopted without following the AP A 
procedures for the adoption of regulations.6o The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Delmarva unanimously ruled, based on the AP A 
definition of regulation, that the PSC standards were regulations and 
therefore invalid.61 The opinion stated that the PSC standards had 
general application to all utilities and their affiliates, they had future 
effect and they carried out the laws that the PSC administers.62 This 
2002 opinion in Delmarva is the first case where the AP A definition of 
regulation had been relied upon to invalidate an agency's action. 
IV. IMPACT OF DELMARVA 
After Delmarva was decided, I spoke at several continuing legal 
education programs for lawyers and judges. I expressed my opinion 
that Delmarva was a very important decision that could have great 
impact. Lawyers had told me of "regulations" lurking within agencies 
masquerading as guidelines, policies, directives, bulletins, memos, 
standards, guidances, etc. None had been adopted according to the 
APA requirements for a regulation. My opinion was that they were all 
invalid. 
In 2004, I agreed to serve as pro bono counsel on behalf of 
mentally retarded residents of the Rosewood Center, a State residential 
center in Owings Mills operated by the Developmental Disabilities 
Administration· (DDA), an agency within the Department of Health 
56. 370 Md. 1,803 A.2d 460 (2002). 
57. [d. at 10-17, 803 A.2d at 465-69. 
58. [d. at 18-19, 803 A.2d at 470. 
59. [d. at 21-22, 803 A.2d at 472. 
60. [d. at 17, 803 A.2d at 469. 
61. [d. at 4,803 A.2d at 462. 
62. [d. at 26, 803 A.2d at 474. 
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and Mental Hygiene (DHMH). A plan had been devised by the DDA 
to transfer some Rosewood Center residents to the Clifton T. Perkins 
Hospital Center, a state psychiatric hospital. The decision as to which 
Rosewood Center residents would be transferred was based in part on 
"Rosewood Center Policy Number 152" which created a Forensic 
Review Board to make decisions regarding Rosewood residents. 
Policy Number 152 had been adopted by the DDA without following 
the APA rulemaking procedures. After the DDA ignored several 
attempts to resolve this matter without resorting to the judicial process, 
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment was filed seeking an order from 
the Circuit Court of Howard County that Policy Number 152 was an 
invalid regulation, and that any decisions or actions made pursuant to 
it were invalid. Shortly after the filing of this lawsuit, the DDA 
abolished the Forensic Review Board and agreed in a Memorandum of 
Understanding that it would "not reconstitute any entity absent the 
adoption of regulations under the Maryland Administrative Procedure 
Act.,,63 
In 2005, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Massey v. 
Secretary, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services64 
(DPSCS) in which the court held invalid "Directives" of the DPSCS.65 
These Directives created and defined administrative offenses for 
which inmates were subject to administrative discipline.66 The 
Directives also set forth the types of discipline available upon a 
finding of guilt, and set forth procedures for charging inmates with 
offenses and for imposing discipline.67 These Directives were adopted 
by the DPSCS without compliance with the APA requirements for a 
regulation.68 The Secretary of the DPSCS took the position that the 
Directives were not regulations. The Court of A~peals of Maryland 
held that the Directives were "clearly" regulations. 9 The Court wrote: 
[The Directives] constitute statements that have general 
application throughout all of the correctional 
institutions in DOC [Department of Corrections] and 
63. Seelenbinder v. Sabatini, No. \3-C-04-58287 (Howard County Cir. Ct., 2004) (on file 
with author). 
64. 389 Md. 496, 886 A.2d 585 (2005). 
65. [d. at 498-99,886 A.2d at 587. 
66. [d. at 498, 886 A.2d at 586. 
67. [d. at 498,886 A.2d at 586-87. 
68. Massey v. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 389 Md. 496, 498-99, 886 A.2d 
585, 587 (2005). 
69. [d. at 507-08,886 A.2d at 592. 
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apply to all inmates in those institutions; they have 
future effect; they were adopted by [an agency] to cany 
out laws that the [agency] administers; and they are in 
the form of rules, standards, statements of 
interpretation, and statements of policy.7o 
127 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also unanimously rejected the 
agency's argument that the Directives concerned only the internal 
management of the agency and did not affect directly the rights of the 
public or the procedures available to the pUblic.71 In so ruling, the 
Court held that if a regulation affects fundamental rights, it cannot be 
characterized as pertaining only to internal management,72 and that the 
internal management exception to the AP A rulemaking procedures 
does not a~ply if the agency statement substantially affects rights of 
the public. 3 In Massey, the Court agreed that prison inmates are "part 
of the public.,,74 The Directives were held invalid.75 
The Massey case also tried to send a message to the State that it 
should start to pay attention to this rulemaking procedure issue. It 
noted that although only a few Directives were at issue in this case, 
there were "seven substantial volumes of them.,,76 The court added: 
"We do caution the Secretary and the Commissioner to review very 
carefully all of the directives that they have issued ... and determine, 
at least from their perspective, whether, in light of this Opinion, they 
need to be adopted in the form of regulations.,,77 
V. EVANS' APPEAL 
A few weeks after the Massey opinion, Evans filed with the prison 
warden a request for administrative relief based on the argument that 
the lethal injection execution protocol set forth in the EOM constituted 
regulations that were invalid because they had been adopted without 
following the Maryland AP A procedures for a regulation.78 The 
warden denied this request for relief, and Evans appealed the warden's 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 524,886 A.2d at 602. 
72. [d. at 518, 886 A.2d at 598. 
73. Massey, 398 Md. at 520, 886 A.2d at 599. 
74. [d. at 522, 886 A.2d at 600 (citing Martin v. Dep't of COITS., 424 Mich. 553, 384 N.W.2d 
392 (1986». 
75. [d. at 499,886 A.2d at 587. 
76. [d. at 501,886 A.2d at 588. 
77. [d. at 508 n.3, 886 A.2d at 592 n.3. 
78. Evans, 396 Md. at 348, 914 A.2d at 70. 
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decision to the DOC.79 When the DOC also denied any relief,8o Evans 
appealed this decision to the Inmate Grievance Office (IGO).81 The 
IGO delegated its authority to hear the case, and to make a proposed 
decision, to the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), a 
central hearing agency.82 The administrative law judge ("ALJ") ruled 
that the execution protocols in the EOM were indeed regulations under 
the APA, and because they had been adopted without complying with 
the AP A procedures for adopting regulations, the EOM was invalid 
and could not be used to execute Evans. 83 This proposed decision by 
the OAH AU was then sent to the Secretary of the DPSCS, who had 
authority to make the final administrative decision.84 The Secretary's 
decision was that the EOM "is not a regulation requiring adoption 
pursuant to the APA rule-making provisions.,,85 This issue was 
eventually decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland which ruled 
that the EOM was a regulation.86 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first set forth the APA's 
procedural requirements for the adoption of a regulation.87 It then 
noted that none of the procedures had been followed by the DOC in 
adopting the EOM.88 The Court then set forth the AP A definition of 
regulation, and addressed the reasons why the Secretary of DPSCS 
had ruled that the EOM was not a regulation. 89 First, in response to the 
Secretary's conclusion that the EOM did not have general application, 
the Court wrote that: "there can be no legitimate doubt that the 
portions of the EOM that govern the method of and procedure for 
administering the lethal injection have general application and future 
effect, were adopted to detail or carry out a law that DOC administers, 
and govern the procedure of DOc.,,90 In response to the Secretary's 
position that the EOM concerned only the internal management of 
DOC and did not directly affect the rights of the public, the Court 
responded that the EOM affected "not only the inmates and the 
79. ld. at 332, 914 A.2d at 70. 
80. Id. at 333, 914 A.2d at 70. 
81. ld. at 332-33,914 A.2d at 70. 
82. Id. 
83. Evans, 396 Md. at 333, 914 A.2d at 70. 
84. ld. 
85. ld. 
86. ld. at 349-50, 914 A.2d at 78. 
87. ld. at 348,914 A.2d at 79. 
88. Evans, 396 Md. at 345, 914 A.2d at 78. 
89. ld. 
90. ld. at 346, 914 A.2d at 78. 
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correctional personnel, but the witnesses allowed to observe the 
execution and the public generally, through its perception of the 
process.,,91 Because the EOM had not been adopted pursuant to the 
APA procedures, the lethal injection protocols were "ineffective and 
may not be used until such time as they are properly adopted.,,92 The 
death penalty in Maryland was halted "until such time as the contents 
of [the lethal injection] checklist ... are adopted as regulations in 
accordance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act 
or the General Assembly exempts the checklist from the requirements 
of that Act. ,,93 
VI. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF EVANS 
From an Administrative Law perspective, Evans is not a significant 
case. Evans is a straightforward application of Delmarva and Massey. 
Evans does not make new Administrative Law. Anyone who read 
Delmarva and Massey would have predicted the holding in Evans. 
From a death penalty perspective, Evans is a monumental case. All 
executions in Maryland have been halted by its holding. Evans has 
reopened the debate over the death penalty in Maryland. Unless 
legislation is enacted which exempts the death penalty protocols from 
the AP A rulemaking requirements,94 there will be no death penalty in 
Maryland until a consensus can be reached in favor of the death 
penalty and on the method and details of execution. 
Because of its tremendous significance as a death penalty case, 
Evans may also become a significant case in Maryland Administrative 
Law. This may be true not because of its analysis of the APA 
definition of regulation and the procedures that need to be followed for 
any agency action that satisfies that definition - this article has already 
discussed that Evans is a simple application of past case law - but 
because of its potential impact on Maryland agencies. It does not 
appear that prior decisions from the courts - all of which were against 
the State - motivated State agencies to review their directives, 
91. ld. at 349, 914 A.2d at 80. 
92. ld. at 350, 914 A.2d at 80. 
93. Evans, 396 Md. at 350, 914 A.2d at 81. 
94. I strongly oppose such legislation. See Arnold Rochvarg, Senate Should Not Exempt 
Death Penalty Regulations from the APA, THE DAILY RECORD (Maryland), Mar. 2, 2007. 
During the 2007 legislative session, both the House of Delgates and the Senate rejected 
bills that would have amended the AP A to exempt death penalty regulations from the 
APA's rule making requirements. 
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guidelines, bulletins, policies, or whatever the agency called them to 
determine whether the agency was in compliance with the APA. Nor 
have past defeats in the courts seemed to have stopped State agencies 
from continuing to adopt more of these regulations without complying 
with the AP A. Perhaps, hopefully, Evans will lead to a change in 
attitude of State agencies in their awareness of and obligation to the 
procedural requirements of the Maryland AP A. The public is now 
aware of this issue. Moreover, State agencies should now understand 
that the Court of Appeals of Maryland has demonstrated that it is 
willing to enforce the AP A requirements in a meaningful manner. 
The full extent of the invalid regulation problem in Maryland is not 
clear. Only the State agencies themselves know how many regulations 
exist within their agencies that have not been properly adopted. It is 
much more preferable if this issue is resolved through agency review 
of its own files rather than individual lawsuits in the courts. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law issue raised in Evans v. Maryland was not 
unique. What is unique about the opinion in Evans was the issue's 
application to a public policy issue which attracts tremendous public 
attention. For this reason, Evans may become not only a leading death 
penalty case but also a leading Administrative Law case. 
